Road to COP 29: (Loss) and Damage Control for Climate Vulnerable Countries

Author: Davis Makori

The outcomes of the recently concluded United Nations Climate Conference (or COP 28) in Dubai have left climate-vulnerable nations like Nepal in an all too familiar position- back to the drawing board. 

The headlines from COP 28 included the first-ever Global stocktake, with consensus reached on a wide scope of climate issues on energy, transport and nature and providing guidance for the next round of national climate commitments (NDCs) due in 2025[1]. There was also a case for cautious optimism as COP 28 negotiators compromised on a landmark deal, agreed by nearly 200 countries, “transition away from fossil fuels”. This was a historic first and a hard-won victory in getting explicit language on fossil fuels in the text of the agreement, albeit with reservations from climate activists and small island nations on dropping references to “phasing out” fossil fuels. UN Climate Change Executive Secretary Simon Stiell described the outcome as “the beginning of the end” for the fossil fuel era[2]. There was also significant progress outside the formal climate negotiations — including new commitments to reduce methane emissions, create more sustainable food systems, protect forests, and more.

Photo by: Anish Khatri

However, the arguably most important outcome of COP 28 for many climate-vulnerable countries was a long overdue agreement struck on the first day to officially operationalize the Loss and Damage Fund. The fund is aimed at helping vulnerable countries cope with the impact of climate change. It is also designed to provide complementary funding for humanitarian action taken immediately after extreme weather events. However, a paltry 0.2% was pledged by developed countries most responsible for the climate emergency. Slightly over $700 million dollars had been pledged heading into the last week of COP 28 against estimates that a minimum of at least $400 billion is needed annually to cover the irreversible economic and non-economic losses faced by developing countries as a consequence of rising global temperatures[3]. But in a classic case of new wine in old bottles, the fund will be managed in the interim period by the World Bank, the linchpin of the international financial system that developing countries have been clamoring for radical reform of. 

Heading into COP 28, countries like Nepal could hardly be faulted for not making a compelling case on the scale and urgency to make loss and damage funds available and accessible as urgently as possible. Nepal ranks as the 9th most-affected country impacted by climate-related extreme weather events on the Global Climate Risk Index (CRI) scale[4]. The severity of the costs for Nepal in both economic and non-economic dimensions is acute and is felt at both national and household levels. A 2021 study by DanChurch Aid found that an estimated 82 percent of households in three municipalities in Nepal take out loans to recover and re-establish their homes after flooding and landslides and that 9 percent chose to permanently leave their homes. This is compounded by the rising casualties of extreme weather events[5]. In 2023 alone, Nepal has recorded over 38 casualties from heavy rains during the monsoon season in addition to earthquake-induced landslides that claimed further casualties in October. The total annual death toll has been estimated in the thousands and growing over the past few years. 

The increase in the need for loss and damage funding is set against a backdrop of shrinking funding to meet humanitarian needs. Oxfam has estimated that funding requests for humanitarian needs linked to extreme weather have increased eight-fold over the last 20 years[6]. The UNFCCC has also estimated that developing countries require at least $6 trillion by 2030 to meet less than half of their existing Nationally Determined Contributions.  In this regard, the visit of UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres amidst the ongoing escalation of the crisis in Gaza was a significant acknowledgment of the severity of the climate crisis facing Nepal. Nepal also had its own pavilion at COP 28 from where the Prime Minister presented a six-point list headlined by an appeal to save the mountains. 

There is a unanimous consensus that not only is the funding for loss and damage nowhere near what it needs to be but that impacted countries like Nepal still face significant obstacles in accessing the funding quickly and on a scale commensurate to their need. The failure to include stronger language on the phaseout of fossil fuels is a harbinger of tougher times ahead as smaller island nations and developing nations will not make a sufficient dent in carbon emissions even in the unlikely scenario that they meet their targets such as Nepal’s ambition to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2045. 

Now that the receipts are in from COP 28, what next for climate diplomacy ahead of the next COP in Baku, Azerbaijan in 2024?

While the Loss and Damage fund is a lifeline for many climate-vulnerable communities and countries, the first line of defense is localized climate action that can mitigate the impact of climate vulnerabilities. Even as the details of the administration of the Fund remain pending in protracted bureaucracy ahead of COP 29, countries can simultaneously take action to address the ecological impact of development projects over which they have influence. 

A case in point and a sore spot for many conservationists is the obliviousness of Nepalese and Indian policymakers to the impact of poor water management and poorly designed flood control infrastructure. The water table on both sides of the Nepal and Indian border has gradually declined due to over-extraction by deep tube wells as well as the destruction of the groundwater recharge areas of the Chure Range[7]. The Chure is being ravaged by quarries, deforestation, and population growth. In addition, according to the Asian Development Bank in 2018, the damming of rivers for hydroelectric power has had massive environmental costs with serious and irreversible impacts such as a decline in populations of many fish species[8]. Such inconsistencies and contradictions between local priorities and global aspirations not only exponentially increase the scale of the need for loss and damage funds but will also in the long run undermine the credibility of Nepal’s climate diplomacy. They impose an obligation to address the problem from both ends, by taking the initiative where countries most in need of loss and damage funding can mitigate the impact while simultaneously pushing for the urgency of a just energy transition. 

In addition to ensuring consistency, countries like Nepal also have to reposition themselves to enable funds when available to be channelled as efficiently and swiftly as possible to the communities that urgently need it. This places a high premium on ensuring Nepal addresses the institutional barriers that impede the achievement of the target to channel at least 80 percent of climate funds to the local level. The Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) illustrates how access to Global Climate Funds (GCF) is delayed by lengthy and resource-intensive project development processes. Institutions such as the Ministry of Finance, the nationally designated authority for climate funds, need to take the initiative in facilitating climate finance access by providing clarity on the various financial instruments available and identifying bankable pipeline projects for funding in line with Nepal’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)[9]. Clearing the internal institutional barriers will boost the actual uptake of apparently scarce climate funds but only if the kinks in the absorption of funds by bankable projects are ironed out in advance of the full operationalization of the fund. 

In the grand scheme of things, countries like Nepal are unlikely to make a significant dent in carbon emissions by dint of their size and impact. The slow and protracted march by developed countries and major fossil fuel producers to transition away from fossil fuels is likely to shape the most consequential pathways to addressing the impact of climate change. However, there is potential to limit some of the damage that climate-vulnerable communities face by ensuring internal alignment on climate priorities with climate diplomacy and taking on the necessary internal reforms to ensure climate funds flow to the local level efficiently. 

The views and opinions expressed in the piece above are solely those of the original author(s) and contributor(s). They do not necessarily represent the views of Governance Monitoring Centre Nepal and/or Centre for Social Change.


Davis Makori is a Rotary Peace Fellow at Uppsala University pursuing a Masters in Peace and Conflict Research. He is also a 2021 Obama Foundation Scholar (Columbia University) and a 2022 Sakharov Human Rights Fellow. He formerly worked as the Advocacy and Campaign Manager at Crisis Action, an organization that works as a catalyst and coordinator for coalitions working together to protect civilians from armed conflict and with Oxfam International as a policy and advocacy adviser in 2022. He has experience in campaigns and advocacy initiatives that bring together grassroots civil society organizations with regional and global civil society to compel policymakers to respond to human rights and humanitarian crises. 

[1] World Resources Institute (2023) Unpacking COP28: Key Outcomes from the Dubai Climate Talks, and What Comes Next https://www.wri.org/insights/cop28-outcomes-next-steps

[2] United Nations Climate Change (2023) COP28 Agreement Signals “Beginning of the End” of the Fossil Fuel Era https://unfccc.int/news/cop28-agreement-signals-beginning-of-the-end-of-the-fossil-fuel-era

[3] World Economic Forum (2023) COP28 agrees to establish loss and damage fund for vulnerable countries https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/12/cop28-loss-and-damage-fund-climate-change/

[4] Asia Disaster Preparedness Centre (2023)  Accessing Climate Finance in Nepal: Issues and Options https://www.adpc.net/Igo/category/ID1861/doc/2023-uAQc62-ADPC-Accessing_Climate_Finance_in_Nepal_ForWeb.pdf

[5] Loss and Damage Collaboration (2021) When the Climate Becomes a Threat: Evidence of Climate Change Induced Loss and Damage in Nepal  https://www.lossanddamagecollaboration.org/stories/when-the-climate-becomes-a-threat-evidence-of-climate-change-induced-loss-and-damage-in-nepal

[6] Oxfam International (2023) Leaving No One Behind: A green bargain for people and planet https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/leaving-no-one-behind-a-green-bargain-for-people-and-planet-621545/

[7] The Himalayan (2016) Exploitation of Chure land causes adverse impacts in Dhanusha https://thehimalayantimes.com/nepal/exploitation-chure-land-causes-adverse-impacts-dhanusha

[8] The Third Pole (2023) Analysis: India and Nepal overlooking environmental issues while signing hydropower deals https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/regional-cooperation/analysis-india-and-nepal-overlooking-environmental-issues-while-signing-hydropower-deals/

[9] Asia Disaster Preparedness Centre (2023)  Accessing Climate Finance in Nepal: Issues and Options https://www.adpc.net/Igo/category/ID1861/doc/2023-uAQc62-ADPC-Accessing_Climate_Finance_in_Nepal_ForWeb.pdf